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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses Chinas Potential as global Capitalisms Systemic hegemony
replacing America. It outlines the internal constraints that restrict Chinas capacity to
serve as a global systemic hegemon in the foreseeable future with special emphasis on
the nature of the Chinese political system and its capacity both for sustaining the level
of economic growth that has occurred since the launch of the Four Modernizations
programme in 1978 and for articulating policies for the emergence of China as a global
hegemon.
Key words: China, Capitalsim, hegemony, state party relationship
Can China Save Capitalism?
The credit crisis of 2007-2009 has revitalized the debate about the durability
of US global hegemony. Since at least the end of the Second World War America has
served as global capitalisms principle authoritative organizer  its armed forces guarantee
the continued expansion and survival of global capitalist rule. American norms, procedures
and transaction forms increasingly serve as standards for structuring capitalist regulation
regimes throughout the capitalist world. During much of the previous six and a half
decades it is buoyant American demand which has ensured relatively long upturns in
the global business cycle and the corresponding brevity and shallowness of global
capitalist recessions.
Since at least the mid 1970s many authors have argued that Americas ability
to serve as global capitalisms hegemonic power cannot last long. America now accounts
for about 4 percent of the worlds population and this share will probably be halved by
the end of the century. Americas share of global GDP measured in purchasing power
parity terms has declined from about 50 percent in the late 1940s to about 21 percent
today. Americas savage military assaults on poor, destitute countries have usually lead
to humiliating defeats and endemic chaos for America  North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan ad infinitum.
Most importantly the buoyancy of American consumer demand exacerbates
the fundamental structural weaknesses of the American economy reflected in its massive
fiscal and current account deficits. Therefore the time may soon come when America
will have to relieve herself of the white mans burden

21

Published by iRepository, April 2021

https://ir.iba.edu.pk/businessreview/vol4/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54784/1990-6587.1329

Business Review

Volume 4 Number 2

July - December 2009

Can this burden be shifted to yellow shoulders? The first part of this paper
will present the views of those authors who believe that China can replace America 
like America replaced Britain in the twentieth century  as the new global capitalist
hegemony. The second part will identify some internal obstacles which may prevent
China from playing this role. The concluding section assesses these arguments.
I.

Global Capital Expects China to do Her Duty.

The 2007-2009 credit crunch that emerged in America and much of Europe is
usually attributed to a decline in non financial investments, a build up of corporate
savings and an insufficient long term recovery of profits from the troughs of the 1970s.
But West Europe and America have now been joined by what are called the newly
industrializing countries as important engines of capitalist growth. The scope of the
circuit of capital has expanded enormously since the 1970s and the volume of profit
generated by capitalist investment has increased massively even if rates of profit in the
old capitalist core economies remain below the peaks achieved in the 1960s. This means
that new capitalist core regimes are beginning to emerge within global capitalist order.
It is due to these new cores that over the period 1970-2006, annual real global GDP
growth has usually approximated 4 percent and in only five years out of these 36 has
global real GDP growth been below the average rate of growth of world population.
(IMF2007). IMF data shows that there were five recessions during 1970-2006 but all
of them were brief and shallow. Again this may be attributed to the astonishing resilience
of the newly industrializing emergent economies especially China whose growth rate
did not slacken perceptibly even during the East Asia crises of 1997  19981. Old core
countries based multinationals have benefited from the resilience of the new core
countries and their rates of profits in countries such as China are often reported to be
higher than in the old core countries2. In China for example from 1998 to 2006 profits
of industrial enterprises soared from 2 percent of GDP to over 10 percent (Lardy 2007).
The World Bank attributes strong profit growth in China to improvements in efficiency
and labour productivity (World Bank 2007).
It is sometimes asserted that the Chinese economy is not yet large enough to
serve as a locomotive for pulling the global capitalist system out of the sort of recession
it experienced in 2007-09. In 2008 Chinas share of world GDP measured at current US
$ an exchange rate was only about 6 percent. But this is a serious underestimate due
to the holding down of the $ Yuan exchange rate by the Chinese government. In
purchasing power parity terms the share of the. Chinese economy in world GDP was
about 11 percent in 2007 (World Bank 2008). China has been growing at an annual
average rate of about 10 percent during 1978-2008 and the investment to GDP ratio
exceeds 40 percent in most years3. Over a fifth of global fixed capital formation now
takes place in China. Estimates of profits remitted by foreign companies from China
to metropolitan home countries vary widely but are substantial and offset to some
extent the reduction of profits in these countries due to enhanced Chinese competitiveness.
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Profits earned in 2006 in China by US based multinationals exceeded the total profits
they earned during the 1990s decade4. China remains however basically a domestic
demand oriented economy. The World Bank (2007) estimates that during 2006-2007
over three quarters of Chinese GDP growth was accounted for by expansion in domestic
demand. The import to consumption ratio is rising rapidly in China however and booming
Chinese imports contribute significantly to global corporate profitability. In any case
Chinese exports are more of a threat5 to the developing countries than they are to the
West. In 20007 Chinas exports to India, Brazil and Russia exceeded Chinas exports
to America6.
To see the 2007-2009 credit crunch as a typical Marx-Minsky crisis is anyhow
misleading. Corporate profits have recovered significantly during 2001-2007 and the
main industrial companies in most metropolitan countries have reduced debt and built
up cash reserves. Corporate savings are at historical high levels and investors are looking
for relatively low risk, high returns profits. Can China be capitals next global metropole
capable of sustaining high levels of capital accumulation not only in China but throughout
the world?
The answer to this question is not yet clear. First it must be noted that China
is experiencing many of the problems of the West. Thus bad debt accumulation is as
much if not more a Chinese as it is an American phenomenon. Moreover most studies
(O Hara 2006, Lavena and Fan 2008) show that though corporate profitability remains
high in China it has been falling during 1990 to 2003. The capital  output ratio is
also rising and the excess of saving over investment is growing as Chinas external
reserves are built up in America and Europe. Chinese population is also ageing as rapidly
as the population of Europe and America. In his report to the 2007 National Peoples
Congress the Chinese Prime Minister. Wen Jiabao described Chinas growth as unstable,
unbalanced, uncontrollable and unsustainable7.
But all capitalist booms are unsustainable, unbalanced, uncontrollable and
in the long run unsustainable. The current China boom has lasted almost three decades
and there may well be a slowing down of output and investment growth in the forseeable
future. However even if we concede that China is not yet the most powerful locomotive
which can pull global capitalism from its present crises China may well have the potential
to play this sort of a role in the future. The next section outlines some constraints limiting
Chinas potential as a hegemon for global capitalist order.
II.

Why China Is Perhaps Not Yet Ready.

Three decades have passed since the advent of the counter revaluation which
partly overthrew Maoism in China. In 1978 Deng Xiaoping announced the famous Four
Modernizations. These modernizations focused upon opening up China to foreign
investment and trade in a manner which would enable Chinas external sector to serve
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as a key growth stimulant for the national economy. What is usually not recognized 
as Hutton (2007) asserts  is that this did not involve a major withdrawer of the state
from the economy: Local government controlled and managed Town and Village
Enterprises (TVEs) flourished throughout the 1980s and it was their burgeoning
profitability which attracted much foreign investment to China during the 1990s. No
major industrial enterprise was privatized until 1997. Even in 2001 the state had control
of 84 percent of companies listed on the Beijing Stock Exchange (Hutton 2007 p50).
This reveals the connections between the current modernization and the Maoist past.
The modernization built upon the success of the Maoist period especially as far as
institutional redesign was concerned. Industrial decentralization undertaken by the
Maoist regime was crucial to the structuring of the TVEs in the 1980s.
Envisaging Chinas emergence as global capitals hegemonic state requires an
evaluation of the probability of the continuing balancing of the state dominance of the
Chinese economy with the external sectors role as primary growth stimulant. During
the past decade (1997-2007) much of export growth has been undertaken by foreign
producers  American, European, Japanese  located in Chinas Sunbelt. Export growth
at current levels thus requires sustaining a corresponding growth of foreign production
capacity in China8.
Much of this increase in production will have to be financed by reinvested profits
and borrowings in China. Moreover Chinas export growth is also likely to fall as major
export markets contract and domestic demand orientation of the Chinese economy must
therefore increase if Chinas output growth is to be sustained at current rates.
Increased domestic demand orientedness9 is also necessary because of the rapid
upgrading of the technological skills of the Chinese work force (which remains low by
international standards) unskilled surplus low paid workers central to export
processing work are no longer easily available (Freshman 2006 p174).
The structural transformation that China has achieved during 1978-2008 refutes
the argument that a comprehensive embrace of what Hutton (2007 p18) calls
Enlightenment values has been necessary (Arrghari 2007) certainly more economic
and social freedom10 is now available to the ordinary Chinese citizen than was the case
under Mao. But political power remains firmly in the hands of the Communist Party
and the 1989 uprising was almost a complete failure. So far China has followed the path
of the first generation Asian tigers  Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore  which
achieved growth by combining state dominance of the economy, single party
authoritarianism and selective encouragement of market initiatives (Wade 1989).
Western exporters have found it extremely difficult to penetrate the domestic
Chinese markets. Nine years have passed since Chinas accession to the WTO but this
has had very little impact on Chinas imports from the West (Freshman 2006 p43-46).
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This is partly because of the grossly inequalizing character of Chinese growth throughout
the modernization era Croll (2006) cites a 2005 government survey which calculated
in that year that the top 10 percent of Chinas population owned 45 percent of the
countrys personal wealth while the poorest 10 percent owned only 1.4 percent. Moreover
Croll finds that inequality is increasing so that downward social mobility (from middle
to lower income groups) is more common than upward mobility (Croll 2006 p22). Since
the mid 1980s the income gap between town and country has widened and in 2003 a
large proportion of peasants (estimated variously at 23 to 50 percent of the rural
population) lived at or below the official poverty line (Croll 2006 p71-81). Regional
inequality is also very high in China with the Muslim North Western peasant regions
desperately poor.
The gap between the rich and the poor is greatest in the cities. According to
Croll between 9 to 12 percent of urban residents lived below the officially defined
poverty line in 2003. As Croll emphases these estimates exclude the tens of millions
of rural temporary migrants to the cities (2006 p137). In Crolls view income disparities
constitute the single most important constraint on the growth of Chinas mass consumption.
Growing income and asset disparities have produced mass protest and unrest
specially from peasants who still number over 350 million in China: since the early
1990s they have been hurt both by declining agricultural terms of trade and by exorbitant
local administration taxes. Government corruption is rampant in the countryside (O
Brian et al 2006)11. Local taxes are usually illegal (not sanctioned by the state). The
central government often sees these taxes as harmful for they reduce farm output. Since
about 2000 per capita food production has been on a declining trend exacerbating
inflation. But the central governments ability to control local administrations is limited.
Protests against local taxes usually seek to provoke central government authority to act
against that of local administration, mobilizing around the time honored. Chinese adage
the Emperor is just but his officials are corrupt and these protests should not be seen
as a protest against the whole system.12
Peasant unrest has led to the migration of between 110 to 150 million people
to the cities (Hutton 2007 p106). They perform slave labour in atrocious
conditions (Chan 2001). Since the mid 1990s between 50 to 80 million workers have
been made redundant due to the restructuring of state enterprise (Croll 2006 p110-114)13.
Workers protest movements have been sustained by support from both rural migrants
and resident ex-employees of state owned enterprises and have risen dramatically since
the mid 1990s (Chiang 2007) Factory closures have not been resisted and protests
concentrate on inadequacy of redundancy payments. Moreover there were very few
instances of plant level resistance spreading through out the city or region. However
these protests were successful in achieving major pension and redundancy payment
reform which was enacted by 2001 and since that year there have been no major resistance
movements of laid off workers.
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The anti redundancy movements were concentrated in the Rust Belt dominated
by heavy capital goods making plants. Since 2001 a wave of strikes have also hit the
Sun Belt  the home of the new expanding export oriented firms. The new wave
strikes are also defensive14. They are best seen as demands for the effective implementation
of the existing labour law. Thus these straggles are not against capitalism but against
capitalists who violate capitalist laws to compensate for declining profit rates15. The
working class protesters in cities such as Shenzen are trying to use the power of the
capitalist state to discipline capitalist enterprises. Workers protests against systemic non
implementation of capitalist laws is tolerated as long as it remains spontaneous plant
specific, non political and does not involve the organization of independent16 unions.
In my view there is no evidence that the new wave unrest seriously threatens the
dominance of the existing governance system. I see the Chinese incumbent regime as
headed for the gradual piece meal introduction of the type of social democratic reforms
that were introduced in Germany during the last decade of the nineteenth and the first
decade of the twentieth centaury.
China is now a full fledged non liberal capitalist economy like  late nineteenth
century Germany and Japan  with the commodification of land and labour the inter
mingling of corporate and state property and the systemic dominance of finance capital17.
China has also succeeded in developing an authoritarian capitalist state structure
during the first decade after the introduction of the Four modernizations which led to
the defeats of the imperialist funded 1989 unrest and avoided the type of implosion of
state and Party that the USSR and East Europe experienced18.
The economic power of the state is reflected in the continuing strength of both
state owned enterprises and local governments which own a great deal of financial
capital and are major players in the land market. State enterprises are seen as the
development arms of the governments. Unlike foreign firms and joint ventures state
firms produce mainly for the domestic market and not for exports. Since 1998 reducing
dependence on foreign markets and increasing production to serve domestic demand
has been a major objective of state economic policy (Yun-Wang 2005)19. Infrastructure
and info structure investment by the state is specifically directed to this end. During
1990-2006 over 90 percent of investment in China has been domestic market oriented
and rates of return to domestic investment have been exceptionally high (Yun-Wang
2005). The Chinese labour force  specially that employed in domestic and state enterprise
 has been ruthlessly exploited and in a typical year more than 40 percent of GDP is
absorbed in capital formation.
Many of Chinas new billionaires20 have emerged from the ranks of the state
bureaucracy and maintain their links with both state and party apparatuses. They have
been the major beneficiaries of state enterprise privatization. Close links with the Party
is good for business Managers of state enterprises and banks, like their German and
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Japanese predecessors, function as state capitalists  many of them own shares in
workers co-operative and state corporations. The banking system  which is still 80
percent state owned21 is a very generous source of cheap investment finance (specially
for local government ventures). Over 50 percent of bank financing is for state owned
enterprises22. Very generous lending has burdened the Chinese banking system with a
high level of bad debt. (The infection ratio was rumored to be almost 50 percent in
1999-2000). This accentuates the crises management role of the state.
Economic liberalization has been a state project in China since 1978 as it was
in Bismarcks Germany. The governing role of the Communist Party and the State
Council remains crucial in the whole process. The form of state governance has been
restructured to foster bourgeois dominance of the social order (and some would say also
of the state form). The state has not shrunk in the process  quite the contrary it has
sprawled and the complexly of state social intervention has increased enormously.
The essence of this state sprawl is the structuring of a new relationship
between central and local government. The central government remains firmly in
command and market and society liberalization occurs not spontaneously but in response
to the promulgation of new laws by the state. This has been accompanied by a downward
shifting of state power. Autonomy of local  specially city  governments has been
expanded significantly. Fictionalization of the Party seems to have increased in response
to straggles for preserving or enhancing autonomy of different tiers of local government23.
Big city factions seem to have acquired particular strength within the Party (Wu 2003).
Local government authorities  at different tiers  city, provincial and county  are
Chinas principal overseers of development. They have been given specific powers
 including seizure of land and sanctioning of infra structure facilities  to foster growth
enhancing partnerships. State and party officials at the local level are encouraged to
play an entrepreneurial role: They have stakes in private businesses and serve as
managerial directors of state enterprises. Party cadres are assessed for promotion within
the Party on the basis of their effective participation in development projects.
Local governments also enjoy an enhanced level of fiscal autonomy  their
revenue depends more on local rents and taxes then on central government subventions.
China is now one of the most decentralized states in the world in a fiscal sense. A vital
source of local revenue is business taxes and profits and sales of state firms. The local
state and Party have become agents of particular capitals.
This is also at last partly true of the central government and Party apparatus.
Central government and Party officials protect and benefit from protecting  particular
capitalist interests. Since 2002 private businessmen have been admitted into the Party
and they are now said to constitute the majority of its national leadership (Dickson
2005). But like in Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan the ultimate legitimacy of the
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central state (and Party) derives from its ability to ensure capitalist development in
China as a whole  not just the advancement of particular (regional and corporate)
capitals. The central state and Party remain committed to a widespread diffusion of the
benefits of capitalist development throughout China and periodically launch campaigns
against corruption to address the most rampant injustices.
III

Can China bear the White Mans Burden?

China cannot be the main force behind capitalist revival in the present
downturn24. The weight of Chinese production consumption and finance in global
aggregates is simply not large enough today to enable China to play a leading role in
world capitalist revival. Indeed Chinese growth may itself decelerate due to the global
recession since China remains dependent on both exports and imports as growth stimulants
because of her low technological development and distributional constraints on the
expansion of domestic demand: Moreover since multinationals and not state owned
firms are the main driving force behind Chinese export growth, setbacks in headquarter
countries (U.S, Europe, Japan etc). may reduce foreign investment in China thus
restricting that countrys export growth.
This does not of course mean that China cannot play an important role in global
capitalist revival. Obviously it can, since it continues to grow at least three times faster
than the metropolitan capitalist countries and is therefore an increasingly significant
absorber of surplus25 capitalist production and savings. The question therefore is, can
Chinese high growth be sustained for a sufficiently long period to enable it to eventually
replace America as the global capitalist hegemon as America replaced Britain in the
twentieth century?. There is also the question; does the Party leadership seek to play a
systemic hegemonic role.
In the case of the United States the main stimulant to development has been
the growth of domestic demand. The Chinese government recognizes that increased
domestic demand orientation is crucial both for growth sustenance and for reducing
macroeconomic instability and sectoral imbalances (Croll 2006 Chapter 8). The main
constraint on the growth of domestic consumption specially for the types of goods that
China itself produces is the increasingly unequal distribution of income and wealth
leading to the concentration of purchasing power in the hands of groups with relatively
high propensity to import and high propensity to save26. But is prioritizing domestic
demand growth compatible. with the political agenda of the post Maoist modernizing
Communist Party (CCP).
The Post Maoist CCP has built an absolutist capitalist state27. Table1 contrasts
liberal and absolutist capitalist state structures.
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Table 1: Liberal and Absolutist Capitalist State Structures.
Structural Element

Liberal Capitalist State

Absolutist Capitalist State

Tasks

I. Establishing market dominance
over society.
II. Separation of public and private
spheres of society.

I. Expansion of the public sphere.
II. Maintaining a balance between plan
and market authority.
III.Private atomization.

Personal recruitment

Intellectual and personal qualities
enabling effective representation
leading to an absorption of the will
28
of all into the general will .

Technical and mobilization ability
to ensure / enhance mass acceptance
of the governing groups conception
29
of the general will .

Resources

Taxation

Public investment Taxation Price setting.

Modus Vivendi

Impersonal rule application, Legalism. Administrative decree, governing groups
bargaining and factionalization, selective
subsidization and penalization

Patterning of authority

I. Separation of executive legislative
and judicial authority and apparatus
II. Bureaucratic hierchy

I. Executive dominance.
II. Ad hoc interventions and initiatives of
apex political authority.
III. Party organization at mass level.

Output
Domestic policy

I. Legal procedure unification.
II. Development of the market.

I. Administrative regulation (also) of
market forces.
II. Development of productive forces.

Output Foreign policy

International co-operation and
competition and promotion of
global market strength of nationally
based capital. War unending to
sustain competitive advantages.

I. Imperialist expansion for preferential
access to markets and recourses
II. Promotion of interests of national
capital through international bargaining.

Formal separation of state officials
from social organization

I. Merger of public and private
bureaucracies
II. State (official) penetration of mass
organizations.

Discipline

Technical flexibility Mass mobilization

Output
State society relationship

Social spirit
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Source Based on and derived from Poulantzis (1973) and Theoborn (2006)
China does not of course fit neatly into our absolutist capitalist state category
which is no more than a heuristic device. Nevertheless China is significantly closer to
the absolutist than to the liberal capitalist category.
China is no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat 30 but it is a dictatorship
nevertheless and the Maoist political programme and infrastructure has been modified
but not abandoned. I hold this view because.
·

The state has sprawled  its sphere of social intervention has expanded not
shrunk.

·

Planning has not been abandoned. The state seeks to govern the market not just
regulate it.

·

The state promotes social atomization of individuals through intensified competition
at all levels.

·

Mass mobilization campaigns play as important role in enhancing state legitimacy.

·

Public investment remains large and state firms continue to produce a large
proportion of total output.

·

Factionalization at all party and government levels and bargaining at the top largely
determine political outcomes.

·

Party declarations and ad hoc administrative decrees are major instruments for
policy articulation.

·

Modernization / development is the raison detre of CCPs monopoly of political
power.

·

Promotion of Chinese economic interests is the principle objective pursued by
Chinese foreign policy.

·

There is wide spread merger of state and private sector bureaucracies and continued
party presence at factory level.

Can such a state aspire to and achieve hegemonic status within global capitalist
order? One broadly similar state, Bismarcks Germany tried to achieve global hegemonic
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status and was defeated by America. In my view it is unlikely that China will embrace
similar ambitious for China does not need the living space access to which determined
Germanys political strategy during 1871-1944. Moreover the difference in the military
capacity of China and the United State is so large that contesting US global hegemony
militaristically is currently unlikely to be seen as a realistic policy objective by the CC.
Crucial to understanding Chinese strategic ambitions is a grasp of the relationship
that has developed between local and central government in post Maoist China  China
is today one of the most fiscally and administratively decentralized states within global
capitalist order. The executive authority of local government tiers has expanded
enormously since 1979. State sprawl involves a deliberate and planned shift of
executive authority to local government tiers which are seen as the principle executors
of public development policy.
However this expansion of the executive authority of local governments has
not weakened the central state institutions. This is because modernization / liberalization
is not a spontaneous process in China today31. It is a central state project. The role of
the Communist Party and the State Council remains crucial in determining the pace and
direction of capitalist modernization. The Communist Party deliberately and in a planned
manner facilities the embourgment of economy and society. As noted above since 2002
businessman have been admitted into the Party and the ranks of Chinese billionaires
have been swelled by ex bureaucrats exploiting links with local and central party and
state apparatuses. Both local and central state structures have extensive links with
multinationals and factional straggles within the Party and state institutions often reflect
a clash of business interests.
The Communist Party now represents the bourgeois and like Bismarcks
Germany, China has become a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeois are
a small minority and prioritizing their interests exacerbates income and asset distributional
inequities. The role of the Communist Party and the central state leadership remains
crucial in (a) reinterpreting ideological discourse to legitimate socio  economic
embourgment and the distributional inequalities it entails. (b) ameliorating the worst
consequences of these inequities and spreading the benefits of development throughout
China to facilitate the growth of domestic demand.
The continued need for central state policy dominance has been widely
recognized throughout China. China has been a unified state since 221BC when the Qin
dynasty put an end to the Warring States era (475 BC to 225 BC). This period and the
proceeding one (770 BC to 476 BC).32 when China was divided into several independent
states is widely regarded as disastrous in China as is the period of the war lords
characterizing the later years of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the period of nationalist
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rule (1911-1949). Authors such as Bray (1984) particularly stress the adverse impact
of the decline of local trade which accompanied state structure fragmentation in China,
Self governing local communities have usually not flourished in China (Xu and Wu
2001). It is not surprising that while local governments struggle against each other for
greater central government patronage and privileges they do not straggle for restricting
the authority of the central government institutions or the Party33.
The authority of the central Chinese state is not being undermined by increased
local autonomy and there are no credible threats to Chinese unity. The exception to this
may be Tibet and the Muslim dominated provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghain, Gansu and
perhaps Sichuan where resentment against Chinese rule is increasingly widespread and
where China continues to pursue a brutally repressive policy for the last six decades:
In these province the local population is being turned into a minority and is systematically
denied access to material resources and employment opportunities (French 2003). In
the Muslim provinces and in Tibet large segments of the local population have since
2006 been herded into reservation settlements like those imposed on Red Indians and
Aborigines in America and Australia, These people are without employment and ravaged
by disease and alcoholism. This facilitates Chinese exploitation of the mineral and
agricultural wealth of these regions (Hore 2007 p83).
Occupation of the Muslim provinces and of Tibet is justified on grounds of
imperialist conquest (by the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties) The Peoples Army and
local state forces continue to act as an occupation force in the Muslim provinces and
in Tibet. Unlike the rest of China mass resistance in the Muslim provinces is against
Chinese state authority and not for combating systemic corruption33.
Together the Muslim majority and Tibetan majority provinces constitute one
third of Chinas land mass34. Maintaining control of these areas is an important Chinese
imperialist policy objective35. But beyond this China has no expansionist ambitions.
Nor is it likely to have and hegemonic ambitions as a large as the disparity in terms of
military strength with the United States remains huge.
Therefore China is not a contender for the role of global hegemon as Germany
was in the first decade of the twentieth century. It is quite happy to play second fiddle
to America. It has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in American government
treasury bills. It actively supports the American war of terror in Afghanistan and Iraq
and endorses the American strategy in the Middle East and in Pakistan. As a member
of WTO and other inter governmental organizations it continues to adopt and adapt
Americanas economic standards and procedures. China is not ready to shoulder the
white mans burden nor is the White Man willing to transfer this burden to yellow
shoulders.
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Notes
1.

The recovery of the other East Asian economies  South Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand  was also astonishingly rapid

2.

Evidence on this is mainly conjectural for estimates of corporate profitability in
America (for example) exclude profits of these companies from overseas operations.

3.

Figures in this paragraph are from World Development Indicators, an annual
publication of the World Bank. (Various years).

4.

U.S Today 25th October 2007.

5.

To conceive of Chinese exports as a threat| to global profitability is a mercantilist
perspective Chinese exports may alternatively be seen as stimulating both
consumption and investment growth specially in developing countries.

6.

The Economist. 6th March 2008.

7.

Reported in Financial Times 13th March 2007.

8.

Hutton (2007 p31) maintains that if Chinese exports maintain their current growth
over the next fifteen years Western multinationals already in China would have
to maintain a rate of growth of output which has to be six or seven times higher
than the rate of growth of their domestic markets.

9.

Thus is already occurring since as we noted earlier only a quarter of Chines GDP
growth during 2006-2007 was due to export expansion.

10. These freedoms most significantly include the right to strike specially for state
workers.
11.

O; Brian (2006) says that these were the most serious peasant protests since the
time of the Great Leap Forward

12. It needs to be stressed that there was no mans support of the1989 uprising. However
in 2003 Chen and Wu published their famous Will the Boat Sink the Water detailing
peasant oppression. It was banned throughout China. It sold an estimated 12 million
copies over eighteen months and was seen as inciting sedition by the government.
13. In some Muslim North Eastern regions unemployment is said to have reached
8 percent in 2000 (Becker 2001 p 38-48).
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14. That is they protest denial of workers rights as defined by existing laws (especially
failure to pay wages on time).
15. Profits in Chinese export oriented industry have been failing since 2002. Due to
over production and intensified competition.
16. That is non Communist Party dominated unions.
17. This trend is however not yet complete.
18. This is not to deny that much of China remains pre capitalist. Capitalist property
and finance has not penetrated many parts of the economy and state authority is
not fully articulated as an agent of capital accumulation.
19. Although exports have risen significantly since Chines entry into the WTO in
2000 and the export to GDP ratio stood at 37 percent in 2007.
20. In 2007 there were estimated to be seven (dollar) billionaires and about 300,000
(dollar) millionaires in China (Walker and Buck 2007 p54).
21. Although it is being cautiously privatized.
22. State bank financing played a major role in preventing collapse of state enterprise
during 2000-2004.
23. Expansion of the power of metropolitan cities to annex neighborhood smaller
cities seems to be particularly contentious.
24. That is the 2007-2009 recession.
25. Surplus in the sense that effective demand does not exist for their purchase
26. This is also a major cause of the relative unprofitability of state owned firms and
Town and Village Enterprises (as against foreign firms) which produce mainly for
the domestic market and not for exports.
27. The term is Perry Andersons. See his classic study (1971). However our conception
of the absolutist state differs significantly from Perry Andersons conception.
28. The liberal capitalist state most ensure that the majority of the citizenry (the will
of all) continues to endorse. The general will which legitimizes capital accumulation
as the socially supreme end in itself.
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Increasingly publicly sanctioned market transactions are presumed to define the
general will. The liberal capitalist state seeks to protect and promote (through law and
administration) specific market conceptions of the general will. In absolutist capitalist
states the governing group (s) defines the general will on the basis of a prioritized
group (usually nation or class) interest. This usually leads to a greater or lesser,
increasing or decreasing subordination of the market to the plan. For a classic discussion
of the relation of the will of all to the general will see Rousseau (1984). For a justification
of conserving of the general will as the will to perpetually priorities capital accumulation
as the socially supreme end in itself see Ansari and Arshad (2006 chp2).

30. I have argued elsewhere (1990 sec11) that the dictatorship of the proletariat is
also a capitalist state form on the grounds that the ultimate objective perused by
the dictatorship of the proletariat is material abundance and this legtimates the
prioritization of (long run) capital accumulation as an end in itself.
31. As it was in America in the 19th century when state governments contested federal
functional authority.
32. Called the Spring and Autumn period of Chinas history.
33. This is also true of the peasant and worker protest movements which straggle
usually on the bases of the platform The Emperor is just but his officials are
corrupt. They resent the abuse of authority and do not regard the constituted state
authority as unjust or inefficient or illegitimate.
34. But they account for only about 2 percent of Chinas population.
35. An objective increasingly difficult to achieve due to growing popular resistance
despite the absence of any significant external support for the Muslim resistance.
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